Lobbying in Congress

E·N·Q·U·I·R·Y
DEMAREE J.B. RAVAL

Lobbying in Congress
Sunday, 02 23, 2003

The Senate investigations into the activities of a well-oiled, US-funded lobby group called AGILE (Accelerating Growth, Investment and Liberalization with Equity), related to the passage of the amendments to the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), prompt us to take a look at the state of lobbying in the current Congress.

Lobbying, an indispensable element of the legislative process, is defined under Republic Act No. 1827, otherwise known as the “Lobby Law,” as “the practice of promoting or opposing the introduction or passage of legislation before either House of the Congress of the Philippines or any of its committees.” A concrete expression of the constitutional right to petition, lobbying is basically addressing or soliciting members of the legislative body for the purpose of influencing their vote.

Although protected by the Constitution, lobbying activity is not without its limits. It must be borne in mind that lobbying oftentimes is mired in controversy. A case in point is the lobby work done by the Federation of Chinese Chambers of Commerce in 1955. The House committee on privileges and internal government then found the said federation to have mobilized both men and money to effect a repeal of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law. Other illustrations are the multimillion-peso lobby for the approval of the reparations agreement with Japan, and the approval of franchises in the telecommunications and airline industries.

To regulate the conduct of lobbying, Congress enacted the Lobby Law in 1957 to prohibit corrupt or undesirable methods of lobbying, promote a high standard of ethics in the practice of lobbying, prevent harassing, unfair and unethical lobbying practices, and provide a licensing of lobbyists and the suspension and revocation of such licenses. Patterned directly after the United States Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act enacted in 1946, the Lobby Law regulates lobbying as follows: First, the licensing of lobbyists for a fee of P75.00 a year; second, the registration with Congress of both lobbyists ant their employers; third, the publication of the names, addresses, expenditures and obligations of both lobbyists and their employers, together with the legislative measures in which they are interested; and, finally, the prohibition of corrupt lobbying, unprofessional conduct and false statements.

Lobby groups affect the operation of government by persuading key persons in Congress to act in accordance with their interests. Groups monitor government activity that might affect them, initiate government action through Congress to promote their interests, and block action that would work to their detriment.

The time within which lobby efforts may be exerted runs from the moment a bill is just about to be introduced by a member of Congress until an approved bill is submitted to the President for signature. May new bills or transformations of old ones are hatched by lobby groups and later submitted to Congress; on other occasions, groups contribute their ideas to friendly members who rely on legislative staffs for actual drafting. To guard against unfavorable legislation, lobby groups patiently examine all bills and resolutions introduced in order to chart a course of action; hostile bills are followed through the legislative mill as assiduously as their own proposals.

At no time is the life of a bill more vulnerable than when it reaches the committee stage. Once a committee clears a bill, the battle is almost finished. The main battle is to get appropriate legislation out of the committee, and if that happens the fight is almost finished. Accordingly, lobby groups usually concentrate their heaviest fire in the committees. A committee decision tends to foreshadow the final outcome of legislation. Alterations made on the floor often are minor in scope, involving details rather than major purposes. Hearings are thus treated seriously by lobby groups, hopeful of securing favorable provisions from committee members or of vitiating legislation judged harmful.

The more controversial the legislation, the greater the likelihood the lobbyists will shift their efforts to shaping decisions on the floor where they encounter more difficulties in protecting their interests. Because floor action invites public scrutiny, legislators are sometimes more vulnerable to lobby groups there than when a bill is in committee. Every roll call vote on an amendment on a major bill is potentially dangerous to legislators, since their decision, preserved in the records of lobby groups, may cost them campaign funds and election support. Particularly hazardous is a record vote on an amendment whose purpose is to favor a certain interest by bringing it within the scope of a bill or excluding it. The issue is sharply drawn, and to vote against the amendment is perhaps to make new enemies.

The conference committee has become a conventional hurdle in the life of many bills specially the major ones. The reports of these committees not only carry high priority, but also are closed to amendment on the floor. Conference committee decisions thus tend to represent the last word of the legislature. A lobby group able to influence the choice of conference committee members or otherwise able to inject its outlook into committee deliberations is in a strategic position to gain its ends. AGILE’s presence during the conference committee deliberations on the AMLA, right in the Central Bank premises where they hold office, gave this lobby group a distinct advantage.

AGILE as a lobby group has apparently been a fixture in Congress since 1997, claiming credit for many of the laws passed since then. It is about time the Lobby Law is reexamined, toward imposing stricter penalties for violations, and redefining the activities that may be allowed in the light of the sophisticated modes that AGILE employed toward the crafting of the amendments to the AMLA and other laws.


For comments about this website:Webmaster@tribune.net.ph

The Daily Tribune © 2003