What’s the PPCRV doing?

ENQUIRY
DEMAREE J.B. RAVAL

What’s the PPCRV doing?
Sunday, 04 11, 2010

That was the question asked by those who attended the Kapihan sa Sulo yesterday, after Prof. Roberto Verzola of the Halalang Marangal (HALAL), an election watchdog, had detailed the security features of the Automated Election System (AES) stripped away by the Commission on Elections (Comelec), without the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) raising a howl.

Why the PPCRV appears inutile in its tasks as the Comelec-accredited citizens’ arm for the May, 2010 elections is indeed puzzling, leading some to speculate that the much-maligned and unlamented National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) could have made the more effective election watchdog.

Verzola distributed copies of his paper ‘Disquieting Signs That Make 2010 Election Fraud Easier,’ and repeatedly cited Section 6(a) of the Automated Election Law (AEL) as providing for “adequate security against unauthorized access.” Yet, ‘the Comelec has been gradually stripping away security features that were meant to prevent unauthorized access to the machines, ballot boxes, and the ballots themselves,’ Verzosa bewailed. He detailed this gradual degradation of the system security, as follows:

1. The ballot box is not transparent. - Old ballot boxes had a transparent window, to detect ballot stuffing. Transparent ballot boxes are the product of our long experience coping with cheats under a manual system,. At first, the ballot box for the automated election was also designed using transparent plastic. But the Comelec shifted back to dark plastic, supposedly to avoid exposing to light the sensitive ultra-violet (UV) markings on the ballots. This obviously is a lame excuse, because the UV markings are scanned and authenticated by the counting machine before the ballot is stored in the ballot box.

2. UV detection of fake ballots disabled. - The counting machine has a built-in feature to detect and reject ballots without the proper UV markings and are, therefore, presumed fake. However, the counting machine’s scanner was ordered turned off by the Comelec, disabling this authentication feature. (So the ballot box does not have to be dark after all!) Again, this is one less security feature for cheats to worry about.

3. NPO security mark missing in ARMM ballots. - With National Printing Office security marks missing in authentic ballots, it is now easier to pass off fake ballots The cheats are back in business. In fact, with the ballot security measures being stripped away, the electoral system will be fully exposed to the biggest weakness of ballot scanning and counting machines. It will be much easier now for the cheats to mark ovals than write names when mass-producing thousands of fake ballots.

4. BEIs instructed not to use digital signatures. - The Comelec general instructions for Board of Election Inspectors tell the BEI members not to digitally sign the data to be transmitted. The Comelec claims that the machine will just sign for them.

In short, precinct-level elections inspectors have been instructed by the Comelec to send election results without their digital signatures. The Comelec defends this incomprehensible instruction by saying that the digital signature generated by Smartmatic for the inspectors is already encoded into the machine. This is the equivalent of instructing inspectors to sign blank forms, which insiders could then use in whatever way they like. This is an open invitation to fraud. Earlier the Comelec had ignored suggestions that the functions of a digital certification agency be assigned to an independent third party, instead of remaining with Smartmatic. With the functions of digital signature generation, transmission and confirmation concentrated in Smartmatic, which also sold us the system and is furthermore running it, we have the business equivalent of the functions of supplier, operator, accountant, cashier and auditor assigned to a single person. Another open invitation to fraud.

5. Verification of voter’s choice disabled. - Section 6(n) of the AEL requires that the counting machines lets voters verify if their choices were correctly interpreted by the machine, before their choices are recorded. Already built into the counting machine, this feature that displays the actual names of candidates corresponding to shaded ovals and asking the voter to confirm by pressing the ‘CAST’ button. This would have been a perfect opportunity for the voting public to determine the accuracy of the voting machines, right on election day, right before their very eyes. The Comelec has taken away this opportunity, by disabling this verification feature. Now, the voter only gets a ‘thank you’ message. This only means one thing: it is possible for the machine to register a different choice, and the voter cannot complain because he will never know about it. The machine provides no paper audit trail that each voter can actually verify. Voters can no longer verify if the scanning machine has correctly registered their choices.

6. Source code access highly restricted. - The source code is Smartmatic’s general instructions to its counting machines. Pursuant to Section 12 of the AEL, it is incumbent upon the Comelec to promptly make the source code “available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.’ Yet, the Comelec has inexplicably dragged its feet on this issue, making vague promises about opening the source code, but in reality keeping it closed and secret. While the Comelec may have already announced that the source code was ‘open’ for review, it imposed such restrictive conditions that made it next to impossible for local reviewers to do the task. Thus, no stakeholder has been able to review the source code.

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The Comelec has been doing its worst, to guarantee the failure of the AES for the May, 2010 elections. It remains for the PPCRV, the accredited citizens’ arm, to do its best as a watchdog in order to remedy the failings of the Comelec, and to assure the electorate that whatever the poll body has been programmed to do will not succeed.

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