E·N·Q·U·I·R·Y
DEMAREE J.B. RAVAL
DEMAREE J.B. RAVAL
On pardon
Sunday, 09 30, 2007
Pardon means “an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.”
Conditional pardon is “in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power, or the Chief Executive, and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one.”
Absolute pardon means “a pardon that frees the criminal without any condition whatsoever.”
Whether conditional or absolute, the pardon that the government is dangling to ousted President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will simply achieve this: He is free from being imprisoned on account of his conviction for plunder by the Sandiganbayan.
I fail to see why admission of guilt should be a factor in the event that Estrada applies for and/or accepts a pardon. In fact, it goes against the grain of the nature of pardon itself. Precisely, one gets pardoned for one’s prior conviction of a crime; legal guilt has been established by that conviction.
A pardon starts from the premise or incontrovertible fact that one has been convicted by final judgment. No one who has not been convicted can be pardoned. Pardon, however, does not serve to erase the finding of guilt, although it erases the conviction.
This should be made clear to Estrada, and to whoever else commiserates with him for being unable to sit beside the sickbed of his ailing mother, while a debate goes on whether to withdraw the motion for reconsideration already filed, or whether to appeal the decision should the Sandiganbayan deny the motion for reconsideration, and while the government splits hairs on what type of pardon it should give to Estrada.
A pardon, whether conditional or absolute, does not demand admission of guilt as a pre-requisite. Admission of guilt is irrelevant to the pardon itself. In fact, the conditions will not — and cannot, legally — even include admission of guilt. Conditions to be imposed are limited to those which Estrada will have to do — or cannot do — once the pardon is extended to him.
A pardon will not erase Estrada’s legal guilt as established by the Sandiganbayan. It only erases the effects of that finding of guilt. For example, the guilt of Estrada for plunder resulted in the following, as stated in the dispositive portion of the decision (1) the penalty of reclusion perpetua (2) the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual disqualification from public office; (2) the forfeiture in favor of the government of the following: (a) the total amount of P545,291,000 with interest and income earned, inclusive of the amount of P200,000,000 deposited in the name and account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation; (b) the amount of P189,000,000 inclusive of interests and income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account; and (c) the real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as “Boracay Mansion,” located at 100 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
If a conditional pardon be granted to Estrada after he withdraws his motion for reconsideration, the first imperative is that he be freed from his imprisonment. (He will not be freed from his civil liabilities, though.) The pardon will not say he is innocent, because his legal guilt remains. The government will then state the conditions for his release.
If the pardon is absolute, Estrada must be freed from his imprisonment, and the government should lift all the effects of the finding of guilt, without conditions. It will not declare either that he is innocent, for, still, Estrada’s legal guilt remains.
It is taking both sides a very long time to make up their minds. The government is wasting too much time debating whether it is a conditional or absolute pardon that must be given to Estrada, and both premised on whether Estrada must admit to his guilt. On the other hand, Estrada seems bent on imposing conditions should he accept the pardon. Conventional wisdom says he should not; after all, pardon is an act of grace from the executive.
Each passing day brings Doña Mary closer to the grave, and her incarcerated son is desperately anxious to be by her side in her last moments. So, if it intends to, the government, by all means, should, after Estrada withdraws his motion for reconsideration, now issue the pardon. And Estrada should accept it at its face value, conditional or absolute, so he could leave Tanay a free man soonest and see his mother while she is still alive.
Estrada’s legal guilt — or his innocence, which he insists on — is a matter for history to judge. In fact, we need not wait for history to make the judgment. The people have already acquitted Estrada. There is no time to quibble anymore about his actual guilt or innocence: Estrada is innocent, both in his mind and heart and in the people’s verdict.
Nothing else matters for both mother and son but to be together at this time. That chance might never come again.
To the government and to Estrada, pardon is that easy to grant — and to accept (or reject).
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