Impaired ‘initiation’ initiatives

E·N·Q·U·I·R·Y
DEMAREE J.B. RAVAL

Impaired ‘initiation’ initiatives
Sunday, 08 28, 2005

After the ruckus over the reckless raid on Loren’s Ark, let us visit the confused state of the house committee on justice as it tackles the prejudicial questions meant to delay and obfuscate the inevitable. Rolando Gamalinda, a practicing lawyer in New York who had closely kept track of the Clinton impeachment, had this exchange with me.

The insistence of those who claim that only one complaint may be investigated is based on the decision in the Francisco Case. So, let us read Francisco to see if there is logic in this assertion.

The Supreme Court (SC) says it based its interpretation on the intent of the framers of the Constitution, as gleaned from the comments of Commissioner Maambong, which it quoted and underscored: “It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution.” Maambong, as cited by the Court, stated: “As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor.” He then went on to say: “I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.”

Did you catch the drift?

Did the Court base its decision on a proposal that was not accepted? How far must “creative logic” be stretched to conclude that an unadopted proposal is the intent of the framers?

Are we to presume that the ratified Constitution includes the intent of Maambong? Heck, it was not even accepted, that is why he was perorating only for the record. Stated simply, Maambong was ignored. Read the passage and feel his aggrieved woes about how he had been carrying with him the Rules of the US House of Representatives, the Rules of the US Senate, the papers on the Nixon case, etcetera.

Ironically, the ignored comments formed the basis of the decision. Sweet revenge for the ignored Maambong! Touché to Justice Munoz Palma who ignored him!

And since Maambong’s proposal was not accepted, “it appears,” as he presciently observed, “that the initiation starts on the floor.” We must, therefore, conclude that the framers intended the initiation of impeachment proceedings to emanate from the floor, by way of the Articles of Impeachment.

But let us forget for a while the comments of Maambong and read, instead, the Constitution to see if we can ascertain the intent from the very text.

Article 12 is structured to provide a flow in both logic and time: It starts with Section 1, which states that the House shall have the exclusive power to initiate all impeachment cases; continues to Section 2, how the case is initiated - by the filing of a complaint; flows on to Section 3, how a vote shall be taken to approve the Articles; then moves to Section 4, the exception to a vote, if at least a third of the Members sign, the complaint becomes the Articles.

Now, we come to Section 5, which states: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.” Are we talking again of the complaint? Obviously not - because the process has already progressed in time to the Articles. So the only logical conclusion is that Section 5 refers to the proceedings at the Senate.

Note that the provision does not mention the House. This is so, because the prohibition is on both the House and the Senate: that the House shall not proffer, and the Senate shall not accept, more than one Articles of Impeachment against an official within one year. Note, too, that the word used in Section 1 is “case,” while that in Section 5 is “proceedings.”

A “proceeding” is defined as “any procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency.” This further bolsters our conclusion that the time-barred proceeding is the one to be conducted at the Senate, for it is the Senate that grants redress, by way of removal. In fact, the U.S. House Resolutions in the impeachment cases against Clinton and Nixon were resolutions to conduct an inquiry, to determine whether there were grounds to impeach. It is difficult to see how a mere inquiry can be considered a proceeding seeking redress.

To clarify its thinking, the court also relied on the much esteemed constitutionalist Father Bernas, who held the view that the impeachment case mentioned in Section 1 of Article XI refers to the case before the Senate, and the impeachment proceedings mentioned in Section 5 refers to the initiation by way of complaint. We take a different tack.

If the “impeachment case” refers to the Articles filed before the Senate, and the “impeachment proceedings” refer to the complaint at the House, would it not be logical to situate “impeachment case” in Section 5 and “impeachment proceedings” in Section 1? This would be more consistent with the logical and chronological flow of Article 11.

A “case” is defined as “a lawsuit.” It encompasses the inception (filing of the case) all the way to execution (collecting money in a civil case, imprisonment in a criminal case). All the steps in the prosecution of the lawsuit are subsumed in the term case. A proceeding, on the other hand, is a mere step in a case.

There may be many discrete steps in a case. In the hypothetical case of People vs. Cruz, for Homicide, for example, if Cruz wants to question the amount of bail, there will be bail proceedings; if he posts bail but does not appear at trial, then there will be proceedings on the cancellation of the bond. Trial before the court will generally be considered a separate proceeding. If conviction follows, but new evidence is discovered, there will be proceedings on a motion for new trial. If Cruz loses, he may appeal, and there will be proceedings before the Court of Appeals and, presumably later, proceedings before the Supreme Court. All these proceedings come under one case.

From the above explication, it is obvious, plain and clear that there is no ambiguity in the plain text of the Constitution. If at all, the ambiguity lies only in the loyalties of those who interpret; loyalty to their craft of reading the law as it is written, or loyalty to their convictions - reading into the law what they believe should have been written.

We submit that the Court is the final authority on what the Constitution says, though we may question the logic of its decision. In due time, this impudent article will probably find its way into the trash can, but the Francisco Case will long be remembered - whether in admiration or derision, we couldn’t tell.

And although the justices of the Court have spoken, we are not sure either that theirs is the final word. History may yet judge the judges.


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